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How do pro-government militias impact state and human security? Throughout the 
world, governments are more frequently interacting with and employing armed groups and 
militias in order to increase their security and position through unofficial means. 
Additionally, throughout the current academic literature, there are significant 
disagreements on the impacts of pro-government militias on state and human security. This 
thesis examines the relationship and impact of pro-government militias on state and human 
security by conducting a comparative analysis on two recent pro-government militias, the 
Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan and the Janjaweed in Sudan. The resulting analysis of 
this research generates two major theses: First, that the use of pro-government militias can 
provide limited increases in security to the principal who employed them; second, that we 
should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia employment 
and human security. This study also identifies several areas where the international 
community should focus, in order to understand how current or future pro-government 
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A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime 
and human security. In order to evaluate the relationship between the state and pro-
government militias, the thesis focuses on six sub-questions. First, why do states align 
themselves with pro-government militias? Second, how do pro-government militias affect 
a state’s monopoly on force and its overall stability? Third, how does the presence of pro-
government militias impact human security? Fourth, how does the level of recognition by 
the state to the pro-government militia influence both state and human security? Fifth, how 
do the connections between pro-government militias and the general civilian population 
influence both state and human security? And, sixth, how do preexisting group dynamics, 
such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict, influence the impact of 
pro-government militias on state and human security? By delineating the relationships 
between the state, the civilian population, and pro-government militias, this thesis provides 
clarity on the implications and consequences of state partnerships with pro-government 
militias.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
Throughout the world, governments often interact with armed groups that are not 
official members of the governmental security apparatus. Specifically, groups such as 
irregular militias, vigilantes, and paramilitary organizations often operate as agents of the 
state but outside of official control. Various types of militias have been a significant part 
of history and a governmental resource since ancient times. Historically, a militia is an 
armed civilian group that can be called on by the state in the case of war; in On War, Carl 
von Clausewitz called for the use of militias, characterizing them as “a very extensive more 
or less voluntary co-operation of the whole mass of the people in support of the war…ready 
[to] sacrifice of all they possess.”1 Similarly, the United States’ constitution directly 
                                                 
1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 372. 
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addresses armed militias in the second amendment, which recognizes “the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms” in respect to “a well-regulated Militia” which it declares 
“necessary to the security of a free State.”2 There are many types of militias, this thesis 
focuses specifically on pro-government militias, defined by Sabine Carey and Neil 
Mitchell as “an armed group that has a link to government but exists outside of or parallel 
to the regular security apparatus, and has some level of organization.”3  
Despite their historic presence, recently, the prevalence of pro-government militias 
has been on the rise. Recent research indicates that between 1982 and 2007, more than 
60 states had ties to informal armed groups that operated within their territories.4 
Furthermore, pro-government militias have aided and supported state counterinsurgency 
operations in approximately two-thirds of civil wars since 1989.5 Currently, the totality of 
operations being conducted by pro-government militias in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, 
and Syria demonstrates the importance of further interrogating the consequences of pro-
government militias on both regime and human security.6  
Overall, there is a consensus in the literature that both the scope of operations and 
the frequency with which states employ pro-government militias have increased in 
contemporary conflict.7 Various types of pro-government militias are or have been 
prevalent throughout history, but, currently, there is only a limited understanding of the 
                                                 
2 Corinna Jentzsch, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger, “Militias in Civil Wars,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 757, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576753. 
3 Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” Annual Review of Political Science 
20, no. 9 (January 2017): 9.2, doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051915-045433. 
4 Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C. Carey, and Christopher K. Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government 
Militias on Human Rights Violations, International Interactions,” International Interactions 40, no. 5 
(October 2014): 812, doi: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932783. 
5 Jessica A. Stanton, “Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil 
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 899, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576751. 
6 For example, the Misratan militia’s battle against the Islamic State in Sirte, Libya, the Shia Popular 
Mobilization Forces’ operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the use of the Afghan Local 
Police against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the operations of the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan.  
7 See, for example, Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, “States, the security sector, and 
the monopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 
2 (March 2013): 249, doi: 10.1177/0022343312464881; Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall 
of State Sponsored Militias (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1. 
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consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. Therefore, 
by applying the questions outlined above to two cases studies, a greater understanding of 
and framework for the consequences of pro-government militias will be established. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the last five years, there has been an increasing output of scholarly works on 
the topic of pro-government militias. The following literature review covers the major 
themes of the recent literature and explains how the literature relates to the consequences 
of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. The first section defines 
pro-government militias and outlines how they will be categorized throughout this thesis. 
The second section covers both the principle-agent dilemma and the inherent deniability of 
pro-government militias, explaining how both impact regime and human security. Third, 
the literature review examines how states’ employment of pro-government militias impacts 
their monopoly on force and their security. And, finally, it examines how pro-government 
militias impact human security. Ultimately, this review surveys recent literature on pro-
government militias in order to derive a set of hypotheses that potentially explain the 
consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security.  
1. Pro-government Militias: Definitions and Typologies 
Throughout the world, governments are increasingly utilizing pro-government 
militias as a force multiplier and as a cheaper alternative to conventional military forces.8  
Pro-government militias are “complex organizations with a variety of purposes that differ 
across a range of characteristics.”9 In order for a militia to be classified as a pro-government 
militia, it must meet four criteria.10 First, the militia itself must be identified as pro-
government, and possible links between the state and the militia that may identify this 
relationship include, “information sharing, financing, equipping, training, and [or] an 
                                                 
8 Sabine C. Carey, Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell, “Governments, Informal Links to Militias, 
and Accountability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 851, doi: 
10.1177/0022002715576747. 
9 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4. 
10 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 250. 
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operational link.”11 Second, the militia must operate outside of the official security 
structure of the state.12 Third, the militia must be armed and able to commit violent acts; 
however, it does not have to have committed violence to qualify as a pro-government 
militia.13 And, fourth, the militia must have some sort of organizational structure.14 Using 
this framework for pro-government militias allows for a refinement in the understanding 
of the specific consequences of governments outsourcing security.  
Recent literature outlines two major typologies for pro-government militias: 
semiofficial pro-government militias and informal pro-government militias.15 A 
semiofficial pro-government militia “has a formalized and official link to the government, 
though it is separate from the regular military and police force. The government might have 
established the group by official decree or law, and members may receive some regular 
compensation.”16 An informal pro-government militia, by contrast, has an informal 
relationship with a government, which may or may not be widely known and 
acknowledged.17  
The second key characterization of pro-government militias discussed in the 
literature is the pro-government militia’s link to society.18 The two categories of this 
characterization are simply based on “whether or not the group is locally recruited and 
locally active.”19 Ultimately, the literature and this thesis utilize both the militia’s link to 
the government and its link to society to monitor goal variance and the consequences of 
pro-government militias to the state and human security.20  
                                                 
11 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.  
12 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.  
13 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.  
14 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.  
15 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4. 
16 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.  
17 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.  
18 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.  
19 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.  
20 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4. 
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Finally, fundamental to this research are the definitions of regime security and 
human security. For this thesis, the phrase “regime security” refers to the ability of the 
government to remain in power and enforce the rule of law within its borders via a 
monopoly of force; “human security” refers to civilian well-being, focusing mainly on 
physical security rather than life-attainment prospects.   
2. The Principal-Agent Dilemma and the Deniability of Militias 
One of the major themes in the literature on pro-government militias is the 
principal-agent dilemma between the state and the militias.21 Fundamentally, the principal-
agent dilemma examines how a state is able to control a self-interested agent.22 When 
applied to state and human security, the principal-agent dilemma manifests when the state 
is no longer able to control the pro-government militia due to a divergence of interests. 
Ariel Ahram explains that, unlike official security forces, which are directly aligned with 
and tied to the state apparatus, local militias operate in a way more akin to free agents.23 
They may fight on behalf of the state or rebels but are not in direct lines of command and 
control and have some degree of autonomy. Therefore, one major theme in the literature 
suggests that the strength of the relationship between the state and the pro-government 
militia determines how well the state can manage the effects of the principal-agent problem 
and has corresponding consequences to state stability and human security.24  
A second key theme in the literature on pro-government militias is the inherently 
deniable nature of militias, which allows states to commit atrocities without being held 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6; Ore Koren, “Means to an end: 
Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science (2015): 2, doi: 10.1177/0738894215600385; Ariel I. Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and 
the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39, no. 3 (October 2015): 210, 
doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1104025. 
22 Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C. Carey, and Christopher K. Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government 
Militias on Human Rights Violations, International Interactions,” International Interactions 40, no. 5 
(October 2014): 814, doi: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932783. 
23 Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 9. 
24 See, for example, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 813; Carey 
and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6. 
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accountable for their actions by the civilian population or the international community.25 
Ahram argues that “by colluding with nonstate actors, states gain plausible deniability for 
flagrant violence committed against civilians in the course of often brutal 
counterinsurgency campaigns.”26 If governments understand the domestic and 
international cost and consequences of using excessive force or oppression, the rational 
choice may be to sub-contract out these actions to pro-government militias.27  
Consequently, the deniability of pro-government militias may allow states to 
engage in certain types of military actions without the fear of international repercussions. 
Carey and Mitchell argue that some types pro-government militias, such as informal 
militias like the Interahamwe in Rwanda, provide a higher level of deniability and are 
therefore more likely to be used to commit acts of violence.28 Correspondingly, they argue 
“the degree of control [a state wields over a militia] influences the ease with which 
governments can deny responsibility for the violence these groups perpetrate.”29 Therefore, 
because semiofficial pro-government militias are less deniable, one would expect them to 
be less frequently employed to commit acts from which the state is intending to distance 
itself. Furthermore, as Huseyn Aliyev explains, “the ability of the state to mask its 
association with paramilitaries has become critical for any assessment regarding how much 
control the state has over militias.”30 Ultimately, based on the principal-agent dilemma and 
the deniability of militias, this thesis tests the hypothesis that the more official the ties are 
between the pro-government militia and the government, the less perilous the pro-
government militia is to both state and human security.  
                                                 
25 See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8; Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-
government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” 6; Ahram, “Pro-Government 
Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 210; Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 14.  
26 Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 14. 
27 Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell, “Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability,” 852. 
28 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8. 
29 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8.  
30 Huseyn Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence: Towards a theory of ‘state-
parallel’ paramilitaries,” Security Dialog 47, no. 6 (2016): 501, doi: 10.1177/0967010616669900. 
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3. Pro-government Militias: Monopoly of Force and Regime Security 
In “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber famously defined a state as “a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory.”31 However, in reality, developing states often sub-contract 
security tasks, specifically during development or a time of crisis, and this thesis examines 
how that sub-contracting impacts regime security.32 Some of the current literature suggests 
that pro-government militias are both a contributor to and consequence of both weak states 
and state failure.33 Specifically, pro-government militias may contribute to state failure due 
to the problems they create via the principal-agent dilemma; similarly, a weak state’s 
reliance on pro-government militias may also be a consequence of needing to employ a 
more cost effective security force than the traditional military apparatus. Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that the there is little pro-government militia activity in modern developed 
states.34  
Some scholars argue that pro-government militias provide a comparatively cheaper 
resource to solve state problems when compared to conventional security forces.35 Ahram 
contends that “while nonstate actors have been implicated in atrocities, in many 
circumstances they have also provided levels of stability and security superior to a failing 
state.”36 A recent cross-national study found that pro-government militias may not only 
raise the probability of a state achieving victory throughout an internal conflict, but they 
also serve as an adequate counterbalancing tool towards “coup-prone” military branches.37 
                                                 
31 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, edited by 
Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 40. 
32 Bruce B. Campbell, “Death Squads: Definition, Problems and Historical Context,” in Death Squads 
in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, edited by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 17. 
33 See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6; Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak 
states and armed violence,” 502; Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 8. 
34 Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 208. 
35 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6 
36 Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 5.  
37 Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 209. 
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Nevertheless, Aliyev concludes that “as long as there is armed conflict and the government 
is weak, state-parallel groups tend to thrive and increase their power vis-à-vis the state.”38 
Overall, the impact of pro-government militias on the state is one area where there 
is significant disagreement throughout the literature. One side of the argument is that pro-
government militias help the state achieve a monopoly of force and regime security through 
providing a cheaper alternative to conventional forces. The other side emphasizes that the 
limited controllability of pro-government militias leads to a lack of accountability and 
ultimately degrades regime security. Correspondingly, the literature reviewed on the 
implications of pro-government militia on regime security is indeterminate, and this thesis 
intends to clarify this relationship and determine whether both the level of recognition 
between the state and the militia, and the connections between pro-government militias and 
the general civilian population influence the different conclusions drawn in the literature.  
4. Pro-government Militias and Human Security 
Many scholars suggest that pro-government militias decrease overall human 
security because of the pro-government militia’s deniability and the lack of state control 
over pro-government militias’ actions.39 Ore Koren argues that the use of pro-government 
militias by states will often “tip the balance for perpetrating strategic mass killing by 
lowering anticipated government costs.”40 Specifically, this aligns with the deniable nature 
of pro-government militias allowing states to deflect estimated costs. Furthermore, another 
argument is based on the principal-agent dilemma. This argument claims that the inability 
of states to curtail atrocities conducted by pro-government militias due to a lack of control 
or divergent objectives may also lead to a significant risk to human security. Overall, these 
arguments support the hypothesis that, while pro-government militias may initially 
increase regime security through violence conducted by the militias, they may also lead to 
a decrease in human security.  
                                                 
38 Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence,” 502. 
39 See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.16; Koren, “Means to an end: 
Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” 1.  
40 Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass 
killing,” 3.  
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Specifically, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler argue that “informal agents increase 
accountability problems for the governments, which is likely to worsen human rights.”41 
This is likely due to the difficulty in both training and controlling informal militias, and 
also due to the increased chance of informal militias becoming self-interested when 
compared to semiofficial militias.42 Therefore, semiofficial militias, when compared to 
informal militias, should be less prone to the problems created by the principal-agent 
dilemma due to their increased ties to the government. Overall, this leads to the hypothesis 
that the more official the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, 
the less perilous the pro-government militia is to the state and the civilian population.   
Another key claim of the literature is that the proximity of pro-government militias 
to their local area directly influences the level of violence they conduct towards civilians. 
Carey and Mitchell explain that militias that operate in their local area are less likely to 
conduct “indiscriminate or predatory violence.”43 This lack of violence in the local area 
may be due to family ties and other established relationships with the civilian population. 
Additionally, another argument is that militia groups that recruit members by focusing on 
“in-group” and “out-group” discrimination present a significantly higher probability of 
conducting human rights violations against the innocent population.44 Therefore, tracking 
a militia’s recruitment exclusivity and whether or not the group is locally active should 
directly impact how pro-government militias impact human security. Ultimately, these 
arguments support the hypothesis that pro-government militias that operate and recruit 
within their local area may be less dangerous to human security, and that employing a pro-
government militia in an area with negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, 
religious, or resources-based conflict, likely leads to a higher probability of violence.  
                                                 
41 Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 812.  
42 Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 812.  
43 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.9. 
44 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.14. 
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Conversely, some scholars argue that pro-government militias do not degrade 
human security.45 Recent studies have indicated that states do not delegate “shameful acts” 
to militias and that, when states decide to perpetuate “shameful acts” on civilians, these 
acts are conducted in conjunction with the regular security forces.46 Many arguments 
suggest that the state is expected to delegate activities like sexual violence away from 
conventional forces; however, Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordas analyzed militia 
activity in conflicts from 1989–2009 and concluded that states did not delegate sexual 
violence as expected.47 Correspondingly, Jessica Stanton suggests that “militia forces 
rarely use higher levels of civilian targeting than their government counterparts.”48 Overall, 
these authors demonstrate that pro-government militias may not increase the overall risk 
to human security and that pro-government militias and regular security forces operate at 
equal levels of intensity toward civilians.  
Thus, like the impact of regime security, the impact of pro-government militias on 
human security is also actively debated. Many scholars suggest that pro-government 
militias decrease overall human security because of the pro-government militia’s 
deniability and the lack of state control over the pro-government militia’s actions. Another 
key claim is that the proximity of pro-government militias to their local area directly 
influences the level of violence they conduct towards civilians. Other studies suggest that 
pro-government militias are in fact unlikely to use more violence than their regular security 
counterparts. Therefore, the literature reviewed on the implications of pro-government 
militia on human security is also indeterminate, and this thesis intends to clarify this 
relationship and determine whether both the level of recognition between the state and the 
militia and the connections between pro-government militias, and the general civilian 
population influence the different conclusions drawn in the literature. 
                                                 
45 Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordas, “Do States Delegate Shameful Violence to Militias? Patterns 
of Sexual Violence in Recent Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 877, doi: 
10.1177/0022002715576748. 
46 Cohen and Nordas, “Do States Delegate,” 877. 
47 Cohen and Nordas, “Do States Delegate,” 877.  
48 Jessica A. Stanton, “Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil 
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 917, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576751. 
 11
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review outlines multiple potential explanations and hypotheses for 
the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. Outlined 
below are the specific hypotheses presented earlier in the literature review. Additionally, 
Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell’s typology of pro-government militias was extremely 
influential in developing these hypotheses; their framework is mainly based on multiple 
cross-national, qualitative studies.49  
Q1. Why do states align themselves with pro-government militias?  
H1. States align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime 
security at a cheaper cost than traditional force employment.  
Q2. How do pro-government militias affect a state’s monopoly of force and overall 
stability?  
H2a. A state’s employment of a pro-government militia provides the state with the 
ability to achieve a monopoly of force via other means, aiding regime stability. 
H2b. The inability of the state to control the pro-government militia, due to the 
principal-agent dilemma, leads to a decrease in overall stability. 
Q3. How does the presence of pro-government militias impact human security?  
H3a. Pro-government militias decrease overall human security because of the pro-
government militia’s deniability and the lack of state control over pro-government militias’ 
actions. 
H3b. The utilization of pro-government militias does not increase the overall risk 
to human security because pro-government militias and regular security forces operate at 
equal levels of intensity toward civilians. 
Q4. How does the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government militia 
influence state security and human security?  
                                                 
49 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.11. 
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H4. The more official and transparent the ties are between the pro-government 
militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-government militia is to the state 
and human security.   
Q5. How do the connections between pro-government militias and the general 
civilian population influence both state and human security? 
H5. Pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local area are less 
dangerous to both state and human security than those that do not recruit and operate within 
their local area.  
Q6. How do preexisting group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or 
resources-based conflict influence the impact of pro-government militias on state and 
human security?  
H6. Employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group 
dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a 
high probability of a negative impacts on state and human security.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
In order to examine the consequences of pro-government militias on regime 
security and human security, this thesis tests the cross-national qualitative framework 
outlined by Carey and Mitchell against two case studies. The first case study focuses on 
the Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan, a semiofficial pro-government militia, and the 
second case study examines the Janjaweed in Sudan, an informal pro-government militia. 
By selecting both a semi-official and informal pro-government militia, this thesis is able to 
test hypothesis four, which investigates how the level of recognition from the state to the 
pro-government militia influence state security and human security. Furthermore, both pro-
government militias examined in the case studies operated both within their local 
community and external to it and had areas with preexisting negative group dynamics.  
Overall, the cases selected for this thesis allow for specifically testing the framework 
outlined by Carey and Mitchell.  
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Correspondingly, the three major independent variables selected for the two case 
studies are the level of recognition between the state and the pro-government militia, the 
proximity of the militia’s operations to its local area, and the level of preexisting negative 
group dynamics. Although there are likely many more independent variables, these 
variables allow this thesis to create a testable framework for current and future analysis. In 
order to determine the level of recognition and the proximity of operations, this thesis 
reviewed both primary and secondary sources of information on the historical context of 
each case study and tested them against the multiple hypotheses outlined above. The 
subsequent conclusions will provide a better understanding of the consequences of pro-
government militias on both regime security and human security. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
In order to examine the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime 
and human security, the remainder of this thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapters 
two and three will focus on the two analytical case studies evaluating and determining the 
consequences of its respective pro-government militia on regime and human security, and 
chapters two and three test hypotheses one, two, three, five, and six. The final chapter will 
conclude with a discussion on the implications of pro-government militias by conducting 
a comparative analysis of the two case studies in order to test hypothesis four. Additionally, 
the final chapter provides the major findings on and implications of governments 
employing pro-government militias. 
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II. THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to examine the impact a semi-official pro-government militia has on state 
and human security, this chapter describes and analyzes how the Afghan Local Police 
impacted the government and citizens of Afghanistan. In fall of 2001, the United States 
government began robust counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, intending to defeat 
the al Qaeda elements responsible for September 11, 2001. Utilizing northern Afghan 
militias made up of primarily Tajik and Uzbek forces, the United States and its allied 
partners momentarily destroyed most of the al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan while 
simultaneously toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; however, shortly following the 
fall of the Taliban, the newly established government of Afghanistan and its U.S. advisors 
quickly realized that they were facing a growing insurgency.50  
Historically, in order to establish and protect national security in Afghanistan, 
governments have relied on locally based militias or security groups.51 This chapter 
examines the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a U.S. and Afghanistan jointly sponsored locally 
based semi-official pro-government militia. While classifying a local police force as a pro-
government militia may initially result in confusion, throughout this chapter, it is important 
to remember how a semi-official pro-government militia is defined. First, a semiofficial 
pro-government militia “has a formalized and official link to the government, though it is 
separate from the regular military and police force.”52 Second, a semi-official pro-
government militia is often established formally by governmental decree, and third, the 
government may pay the salaries of a semi-official pro-government militia group.53 The 
ALP meets all three of these requirements. In order to test the hypotheses outlined in 
                                                 
50 Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 1, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1002.pdf. 
51 Jones and Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 1. 
52 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4. 
53 Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.  
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chapter one, this thesis is outlined in five sections. First, the chapter looks at the history of 
militias in Afghanistan to set a brief history and precedence of militia use. Second, the 
chapter details the creation of the ALP and explains why the government of Afghanistan 
chose to utilize a pro-government militia. Third, the chapter examines the impact of the 
ALP on state security and human security. Fourth, the chapter provides an in-depth 
provincial level ALP case study on Kunduz Province. And, finally, the chapter provides 
some final analysis, discussion, and conclusion.  
Overall, the impact of the ALP has been very uneven across the country, and the 
findings from this chapter show that, hypotheses one, five, and six were supported by the 
ALP case, and the relationships tested in questions two and three where further defined.54 
Specifically, to address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the 
Afghan government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a 
cost-effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration 
of insurgent groups.”55 This action by the GIRoA supports hypothesis one which suggest 
that states align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a 
cheaper cost than traditional force employment. Similarly, both hypotheses five and six 
which focus on the importance of pro-government militias operating and recruiting within 
its locality, and the impact of the predisposition of the local area on the effectiveness of the 
pro-government militia, were also supported. For example, in the case of the ALP, the 
positive impact of a pro-government militia on both state and human security depends upon 
the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group 
dynamics, such as competing ethnicities, and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate 
the militia within their own locality. Finally, the ALP case further defined questions two 
and three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and 
human security. First, the ALP’s impact on state security and stability varies greatly across 
the country’s regions which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the 
                                                 
54 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police 
experience,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (March 2016): 268, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169. 
55 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.  
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literature review, and second, the government’s decision to employ a pro-government 
militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will 
compare these findings against the findings in the next chapter on the Janjaweed to 
determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-
government militia.  
B. HISTORY OF MILITIAS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, powerful warlords, external actors, and the 
Afghan government itself have employed, respected, and utilized militias in Afghanistan, 
and since the 1980s, militias have played a fundamental role in many of the country’s major 
political and security developments.56 Specifically, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
Abdur Rahaman Khan utilized tribal militias for regime security while attempting to 
centralize the Afghan state.57 Likewise, “starting in 1929, the dynasties of Nadir Shah, 
Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan built a relatively small modern army, while respecting the 
parallel authority of rural leaders and their tribal forces.”58 More recently, the United States 
relied upon the mujahedeen in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and in 
2001, the United States worked in parallel with the Northern Alliance to topple the 
Taliban.59  
But, while militias have been a key participant in many important political and 
security developments, they have also preyed upon the civilian population and weakened 
the ability of the central government to project power to the rural areas. A recent Human 
Rights Watch report explained that “for decades, Afghans have suffered serious human 
rights abuses at the hands of local militias, which include a diverse array of irregular forces 
ranging from armed groups working for tribal leaders to private security companies, 
                                                 
56 Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 259.  
57 The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police (Brussels, Belgium: The 
International Crisis Group, 2015), 4, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-
local-police.pdf.  
58 The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 4.  
59 Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 259. 
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criminal gangs, and insurgent groups.”60 Furthermore, many militias in Afghanistan are led 
by “local strongmen or warlords” whose power is often backed by individual members of 
the national government, creating a situation where these militias’ leaders often have more 
power and influence in their areas of operation than the national government itself.61 
While militias have been present throughout the history of Afghanistan, 
historically, militias have manifested differently in northern Afghanistan where the 
population is more ethnically diverse consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns, 
than in southern and eastern Afghanistan which are predominantly Pashtun.62 Northern 
Afghan militias historically have been employed along political or ethnic divides, and 
groups such as “Jamiat-i-Islami, Junbish-i-Mili, Ittihad-i-Islami, and Hezb-i-Islami have 
all been implicated in egregious laws-of-war violations, particularly during the civil war in 
the 1990s.”63 Southern Afghan militias, by contrast, especially in rural Pashtun areas, have 
mainly manifested as a locally empowered police, or “arbakai,” and these forces have 
traditionally tended to be a “small, defensive, confined to village-level protection, and 
controlled by the jirga or shura that called them.”64 
C. THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE  
1. Factors leading up to the Establishment of the ALP 
 In order to determine why Afghanistan decided to utilize a pro-government militia 
and test hypothesis one, it is first important to understand the major variables leading up to 
the decision to establish the ALP. Since the fall of the Taliban, the majority of efforts by 
both Afghanistan and the international community have been focused on the development 
of a strong central Afghan government capable of projecting power from Kabul to the 
                                                 
60 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local 
Police” (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011) 1, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf. 
61 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.  
62 See for example, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 27; and Jones and Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 
27.  
63 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 27.  
64 Jones and Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 27, 32. 
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border regions, that ultimately led to the creation of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 
Afghan National Army (ANA), whom would be the primary forces tasked with national 
security.65 This, the top-down strategy for security in Afghanistan, has proven to be highly 
ineffective for a number of reasons. Primary among these are that the current Afghan 
government is highly unlikely to be able to maintain the number of forces required to 
project security to the border, there is not a historical precedent for a strong centralized 
government, while there is strong historical precedent of both localized rule and central 
government skepticism.66 Ultimately, this led to an environment where both the Afghan 
government and the international community agreed to start utilizing pro-government 
militias as a cost-effective temporary solutions to the gaps in Afghanistan’s security left by 
both the ANP and ANA.67 Furthermore, this plan to utilize localized defense forces 
mirrored the highly successful use of local defensive forces in Iraq, which possibly 
influenced the decision.68 
As a result, over the last 17 years, multiple community policing initiatives have 
been approved and implemented by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the 
NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.69 Programs such 
as, the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), the Critical Infrastructure Police (CIP), 
the Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS), and the Interim Security for Critical 
Infrastructure (ISCI) were all intended to increase localized security, and most of these 
previous programs would ultimately be rolled into the ALP.70 Support for these militias has 
                                                 
65 Jones and Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 6. 
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69 Department of Defense, Special Plans and Operations; Assessment of the U.S. Government and 
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varied greatly since 2001, and most of the early pro-government militia programs had 
significant flaws. In particular, many skeptics of the early use of militias in Afghanistan 
point to the “corruption, abuse of authority, weak command and control, and tenuous ties 
to GIRoA (Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).”71 Overall, these factors led to 
a complete retooling for how both Afghanistan and ISAF supported and utilized militias, 
and as a result, the government created the ALP, the most significant and largest pro-
government militia ever employed by Afghanistan.72 
2. Mission and Formal Establishment 
To address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a cost-
effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of 
insurgent groups.”73 Formally, the mission of the ALP, as stated in the MoI’s ten-year 
vision for the Afghan National Police, is as follows: 
Afghan Local Police Under the direct supervision of the DM for Security, 
the Afghan Local Police (ALP) will concentrate on ensuring security in 
insecure regions, to prevent infiltration of armed insurgents, and to provide 
the grounds for rehabilitation and economic development, so that the 
National Police can concentrate on providing community and civilian 
policing services. The ALP will undertake their responsibilities in 
accordance with Afghan laws and ALP regulations and procedures. Within 
ten years, as security conditions improve, the ALP will be transformed and, 
after receiving the required education and training, will be integrated into 
the ANP.74 
Correspondingly, when General David Petraeus, the Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces 
in Afghanistan at that time, was asked about the ALP and VSO (Village Stability 
Operations) while testifying before the U.S. Congress, he explained that: 
                                                 
71 Department of Defense, Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 65.  
72 Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 261. 
73 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.  
74 Ministry of Interior Affairs, Ten-Year Vison for the Afghan National Police: 1392–1402 (Kabul, 
Afghanistan: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2013), 12, https://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-
02-ten-year-vision-english-final-version.pdf. 
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VSO and ALP districts also support the larger campaign plan by disrupting 
insurgent infiltration routes and by denying insurgents staging areas from 
which they can attack populations in key districts. By working through local 
shuras and community leaders, VSO and ALP help to mobilize 
communities to defend themselves. After all, no one is more vested in the 
security of a village than those who live there and those who have offered 
their own sons to defend the village.  This ‘‘defense in depth’’ adds 
security in areas where Coalition forces are minimal or absent. In this 
respect, VSO and ALP act as important ‘‘thickening’’ agents to increase 
security force presence, especially in rural areas.75 
Overall, both the MoI and the United States’ mission for the ALP focuses on increasing 
security in the rural areas not fully reached by either the ANA or ANP; that said, the MoI’s 
mission for the ALP seems to be more focused around community policing, while the 
United States’ mission for the ALP seems to be more focused on counterinsurgency.  
 Initially, President Karzai was against the ALP, fearing it could be utilized to 
undermine his power base in Kabul; nonetheless, Karzai approved the creation and 
utilization of the ALP, viewing it as a chance to control and standardize the multiple pro-
government militia experiments in Afghanistan at that time, as it placed them under the 
umbrella of the ALP within the MoI.76 President Karzai formally created the Afghan Local 
Police under the purview of the MoI in August of 2010, approving an initial force of 10,000 
men for a period of two to five years.77 
3. Recruitment, Training, and Expansion 
a. Recruitment 
Initially, one of the main pillars of the ALP’s recruitment structure was that new 
members were required to be nominated by either three village elders or a local shura.78 
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This locally based nomination process was a key difference from previous local defense 
initiatives and was intended to both prevent the Taliban or other anti-government militias 
from joining the ALP and to keep community based abuse from the ALP low.79 However, 
as Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institute explains, “frequently…a 
powerbroker would control the village elders, dictating his preferences through the elders 
in a way that escaped the outsiders’ scrutiny. At other times, the village elders would have 
no problem vouching for militia members as long as they only extorted a rival village.”80 
Furthermore, local shuras were tasked by the MoI with determining the eligibility of 
individuals who had been previously members of past insurgencies.81 Ultimately, while the 
nomination and recruitment process benefited the ALP as a whole, it was not without 
significant difficulties.  
b. Training 
Originally, United States special operations forces (SOF) exclusively conducted the 
training for the ALP; however, as U.S. troop reductions began in Afghanistan, United 
States conventional forces also conducted ALP training.82 Training focused on small arms 
training, how to properly use radios and vehicles, how to communicate with SOF forces, 
and basic first aid.83 Furthermore, in order for an ALP member to receive his pay, he had 
to be successfully in-processed during training, which included, verifying that local vetting 
took place, verifying that the member was between 18–45 years of age, collecting the new 
member’s biometric data, administering a urinalysis, and completing payment paperwork 
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for the MoI.84 The training is scheduled to last 21 days; upon completion, the new ALP 
member is issued uniforms, an AK-47, and communication equipment.85  
c. Expansion 
President Karzai’s 2010 plan for a 10,000-member ALP for a period of two to five 
years has vastly changed, and as of 2015, the ALP was at least 26,000 members strong.86 
Furthermore, the ending of most NATO missions in Afghanistan has increased levels of 
insurgency in the country, further increasing the demand for pro-government forces.87 
Correspondingly the ALP in Kabul is therefore requesting permission to increase its size 
to 60,000-members and for an extension of the program to at least 2024.88  
D. THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ON STATE 
SECURITY AND STABILITY 
Overall, the Afghan Local Police’s impact on state security and stability varies 
greatly across the country’s regions which supports the indeterminate findings on 
hypothesis two in the literature review. Correspondingly, the following section provides 
examples of where the ALP had both positive and negative impacts, and like the literature 
review cannot specifically determine an overall positive or negative impact. The ALP had 
the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when it operated in close 
accordance with the ALP’s guidelines of only operating locally, and when the ALP was 
established in a locality that was predominantly free of any negative local dynamics, such 
as ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict; similarly, there are many cases where ALP 
units negatively impacted security and stability due to deviation from the ALP’s guidelines, 
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or the ALP being established in an area that had preexisting negative local dynamics. These 
findings support both hypotheses five and six.  
1. A Case for a Positive Impact 
Most comprehensive unbiased studies on the ALP focuses mainly on the program’s 
shortcomings; however, there is limited reporting claiming the ALP succeeded in 
increasing regime security. Felbab-Brown a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute 
explains that under the best conditions, the ALP can have a significant positive influence 
on security and stability by both defeating and deterring insurgent groups like the Taliban 
and opening up roads and areas that were previously too dangerous to use.89 Similarly, a 
United States Department of Defense Inspector General report explained that “ISAF, some 
district leaders, and village elders believed that the ALP initiative has been effective in 
expelling insurgents from the district/village levels and preventing them from returning.”90 
Furthermore, the same report explained that many Afghan officials support the ALP 
because they believe that the ALP connects the central government to the villages, is 
extremely cost effective compared to the ANA / ANP, and ultimately, defeats and deters 
insurgents.91  
Moreover, major advocates for the ALP program explain that the ALP is 
safeguarded from most abuses associated with militias due to the program’s requirement 
for MoI oversight, local appointments, and the enduring relationship with United States 
SOF.92 Correspondingly, both the 2013 and 2014 United Nations’ Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) annual reports on civilian casualties in Afghanistan claim that 
many communities welcome the presence of ALP units in their communities, citing 
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improved security conditions that the Afghan civilians attribute to the presence of the ALP 
and the ALP’s locally based recruitment.93  
Additionally, General Petraeus in his testimony before Congress explained that 
overall, the majority of ALP units have been successful at decreasing violence, 
reestablishing communities, and returning commerce to ALP areas.94 Furthermore, he 
concluded that “all of these are important signs of localized progress, and, taken together, 
are increasingly contributing to our overall COIN campaign.”95 Ultimately, these reports 
argue that the ALP had a positive impact on some localities where the ALP both followed 
procedures of staying in their assigned locality which supports hypothesis five, and the 
ALP also had a positive impact when the government employed them in an area that did 
not contain many preexisting negative local dynamics which supports hypothesis six; 
however, the evidence supporting this case is thin because of a lack of available research 
focused on the successes of the ALP. 
2. A Case for a Negative Impact 
Contrary to Petraeus’ positive evaluation, independent research agencies found 
trends arguing that ALP regions had more instability than those without the ALP. A 2015 
International Crisis Group report claimed that “in general, ALP deployment did not 
correlate with greater peace and stability: violent incidents rose 14 per cent in the entire 
country from 2010 to 2014, while the five provinces without ALP saw a 27 per cent 
decrease.”96 The following section continues to evaluate question two on how do pro-
government militias affect a state’s monopoly of force and overall stability arguing that the 
ALP negatively impacted the security and stability of Afghanistan due to a lack of control 
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of and accountability placed on the ALP from the central government, the ALP operating 
outside of their locality, and establishing an ALP over an area that contained negative local 
dynamics, such as preexisting ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict.  
a. Lack of Central Control over local ALP Units 
An assumption critical to the success of the ALP program is that the central 
government, through the MoI and district ANP chiefs, will be able to control and maintain 
the ALP;97 however, throughout Afghanistan, Afghan officials and local communities alike 
occasionally lack the capacity necessary to confront or control ALP forces.98 In these areas, 
the ALP often operates as armed gangs outside of the control of the state, often under the 
control of “warlords and criminals, some of whom are also significant politicians.”99 
Furthermore, these rogue ALP elements often leverage their ties to powerful governmental 
figures or warlords to act with impunity, free from any accountability.100 Ultimately, this 
leads to a situation that hurts local security, undermines governmental authority, and 
significantly complicates the ability of the central government to govern effectively.101 
The increasing departure of coalition forces from Afghanistan further decreased 
Afghanistan’s ability to both control the ALP and hold ALP accountable.102 Felbab-Brown 
explains that “the absence of supervision by, and support from, U.S. forces, meant that the 
militias quickly turned to predation and abuse, and neither local community structures nor 
official government structures, such as district provincial police chiefs, were able (or 
willing) to restrain them.”103  
Additionally, one of the major accountability issues with the ALP, as was common 
with many militia programs in Afghanistan, was the fact that there was not a predetermined 
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method for punishing or disbanding ALP units that either did not support the GIRoA or 
were conducting actives that were not conducive to the GIRoA.104 A review of the ALP in 
June of 2015 requested by President Ghani determined that at least 2,200 members of the 
ALP were under direct “control of local powerbrokers”; nevertheless, the UNAMA 
reported that no changes or measures were observed being implemented to deal with the 
members of the ALP not under GIRoA control.105 
b. The Negative Impact of Militias Operating Outside of Their Locality 
In the interest of testing hypothesis five which focuses on how a pro-government 
militia’s ties to locality impact state and human security it is first important to examine 
how locality impacted the ALP in Afghanistan. 
Throughout Afghanistan, the ALP is restricted to operating in the district that they 
are recruited from in order to prevent the likely hostilities associated with sending an ALP 
from one village to another. In some instances, however, ALP members have been 
operating far from home causing significant difficulties for GIRoA supporting hypothesis 
five.106 Specifically, a 2012 Department of Defense Inspector General report found that 
“some senior Afghan leaders…are employing ALP assets for other reasons that do not 
focus on support to the villages…ALP members were routinely being used as back up or 
reinforcements…outside of their village area - in some cases in other areas of their district 
and even province.”107 Furthermore, this same report explained how most of these “out of 
area” deployments of the ALP were being conducted for personal reasons that did not 
support the overall mission and stability of the GIRoA.108 Correspondingly, in Helmand 
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province, there have been reports of ALP units from Daikundi province coming to 
Helmand and partaking in both attacks and robbery of local shops.109 
Ultimately, both of these reported instances of the ALP operating outside of their 
locality showcase the relationship in hypothesis five which states that pro-government 
militias that operate and recruit within their local area are less dangerous to both state and 
human security than those that do not recruit and operate within their local area. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the ALP had the greatest positive impact on regime 
security when they operated in close accordance to the ALP’s guidelines of staying within 
their assigned locality. Correspondingly, as detailed above, there are many cases where 
ALP units negatively impacted regime and human security due to deviation from the ALP’s 
locality guidelines. Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-
government militia on state security depends upon ability of the state to recruit and operate 
the militia within their own locality, supporting hypothesis five.  
c. Preexisting Group Dynamics Impact on the ALP 
This next section examines the impact of preexisting negative group dynamics on 
the ALP’s ability to increase state security in order to test hypothesis six. In many cases, 
the impact of the ALP greatly intensifies a region’s preexisting group dynamics, because 
the ALP utilizes the authority provided through the ALP to target previous competitors, 
and while the GIRoA and the U.S intended for the ALP to be ethnically representative, it 
often did not manifest that way in formation. For instance, when the GIRoA employed the 
ALP over an area that had preexisting negative group dynamics, such as an area with 
competing ethnicities, the ALP magnified and aggravated the previous rifts. Felbab-Brown 
explains that, “in very heterogeneous, polarized, and fractured communities, the 
establishment of ALP units often exacerbates security dilemmas among the communities 
and triggers an armament spiral.”110 Furthermore, without significant monitoring and 
accountability from Kabul, ALP members often use their new-found authority to settle both 
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interethnic and personal disputes that often predate the formation of the ALP.111 
Additionally, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported 
multiple links between the ALP and both “economic mafia and drugs traders” in the south 
and east of the country, and multiple connections between pre-existing warlords in the 
north.112 This has led to senior officials in Baghis province to emphasize the predation of 
the ALP is ultimately deteriorating the security situation and the overall trust in GIRoA.113  
Moreover, the actions of ALP that have caused either forced migration or a 
migration due to fear, are predominantly in areas where local politics focused on competing 
ethnicities prior to the formation of the ALP.114 For example, a 2014 UNAMA report 
detailed that somewhere between 150–200 families from Farah province were forced to 
move from Khak-e-Safed district based on ALP accusations that the village was supporting 
the Taliban.115 Similarly, UNAMA also reported that at least 100 families had fled from 
Baghlan, Afghanistan due to fears associated with the impunity and brutality of ALP.116 
Overall, both of these actions have had significantly adverse impacts on both Afghanistan’s 
overall stability and security.  
Ultimately, both of these reported instances of the ALP intensifying the area’s local 
dynamics confirm the relationship in hypothesis six which states that employing a pro-
government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history 
of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of a 
negative impacts on state and human security. Correspondingly, there are many cases 
where ALP units negatively impacted regime and human security, because they intensified 
the areas preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, clan or political rivalries. 
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Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on state 
security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of 
preexisting negative group dynamics, supporting hypothesis six.  
3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the ALP on State Security 
Overall, the Afghan Local Police’s impact on state security and stability varies 
greatly across the country’s regions which supports the indeterminate findings on 
hypothesis two in the literature review. The ALP had the greatest positive impact on state 
security and stability when they operated in close accordance to their guidelines in a 
locality that was predominantly ethnically homogenous and absent of preexisting negative 
group dynamics supporting hypotheses five and six; conversely, there are many cases 
where the ALP negatively impacted security and stability, because they deviated from the 
ALP’s guidelines, or the GIRoA established the ALP in an area that contained preexisting 
negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic or resource-based conflict. Therefore, 
in the case of the ALP, the impacts of a pro-government militia on state security are 
indeterminate.  
E. THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ON HUMAN 
SECURITY 
In order to determine the impact of a pro-government militia on human security and 
investigate question three of this thesis, the following section investigates the impacts of 
the ALP on human security. Overall, since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan civilians have 
had to deal with multiple actors conducting human rights violations, negatively impacting 
Afghan human security, and the ALP has been a major participant in many of these 
violations.117 Correspondingly, the UNAMA reports that some of the most common ALP 
violations “include severe beatings, property destruction, theft, threats, intimidation and 
harassment.”118 Additionally, UNAMA has also reported that the ALP has conducted 
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targeted killings, unlawful imprisonment, child employment, and sexual crimes.119 
UNAMA attributed 441 civilian casualties, including 144 civilian deaths, to the ALP 
between 2013–2016.120 The following sections details the impact of the ALP on human 
security by first by providing a few example cases of specific human rights violations by 
the ALP, and second, explaining the role of locality and localized group dynamics on 
predation. Overall, this section does not intend to include all of the human rights violations 
conducted by the ALP; however, it does provide support for a key finding of this thesis 
which argues that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government 
militia employment and human security. Reporting from UNAMA, Human Rights Watch, 
and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission provides the majority of 
human rights violations in this section.   
1. Example Cases of Human Rights Violations by the ALP 
Throughout Afghanistan, the ALP has been responsible for many different human 
rights violations, mainly executed outside of the ALP mandate. Categorically, most 
incidents fall under “punishment/revenge killings, illegal searches, and ‘accidental’ 
shootings in questionable circumstances.” Below are some examples of the above 
violations.121   
 The 2013 UNAMA report on civilian casualties documented 11 separate 
cases of summary executions by the ALP. In one case, on July 10, 2013, 
“insurgents attacked an ALP checkpoint Shindand district, Herat 
province.”122 In response, the ALP went to the village of the suspected 
attackers and abducted relatives of the attackers in retribution. Ultimately, 
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the abductees were executed, and their bodies were found in a nearby 
field.123 
 The 2015 annual UNAMA report documented multiple cases of sexual 
violence against children to include four cases conducted by the ALP. In 
one case, on March 17, 2014 an ALP member was convicted of “sexual 
assault and the rape of a seven-year-old boy.”124 
 A 2011 Human Rights Watch report indicated that in June of 2011 that the 
ALP arrested two boys 17 and 18 years of age under the suspicion that the 
boys planted an IED. Ultimately, the local villager elders were reported to 
have rescued the boys after they were found detained, physical abused, and 
one of the boys was reported to have “nails hammered into his feet” 
requiring hospital care in Pakistan.125 
 A 2015 International Crisis Group report detailed the summary executions 
of 45 prisoners by an ALP commander in Logar province. Including one 
execution that involved “a suspected Taliban militant who was blindfolded 
and used as target practice for rocket-propelled grenades.”126 
Ultimately, violations like these by the ALP, while rare, greatly decrease the overall human 
security in Afghanistan.  
2. The Importance of the Locality and Localized Group Dynamics 
Throughout Afghanistan, the localized group dynamics, such as ethnic composition 
of an area, and the ability of ALP to remain local greatly impacts the level of predation of 
the ALP on the population, and both of these findings support hypotheses five and six. For 
example, less predation by the ALP is observed in locations where the ALP naturally arose 
from the local population to defend the community from an external pressure.127 
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Correspondingly, the chance of the ALP preying on and abusing the population greatly 
increases if they operate outside of their local area, or are formed in an area that suffers 
from interethnic, political or resource contention.128 This dynamic has manifested in many 
ways. In one example, a Tajik ALP commander in a northern province closed roads to 
Pashtun travelers; eventually, his actions led to increased local strife and the local Pashtun 
community killed him.129 In another case, local leaders employed the ALP outside of its 
assigned local region in Daikundi province resulting in the robbery of local villages and 
shops.130  
Overall, the ALP is assessed to be more prone to prey on the local population when 
the ALP does not stay within its assigned locality and the local dynamics, such ethnic and 
political rivalries, don’t support the presence of a local militia. Therefore, in the case of the 
ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on human security depends upon the 
ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group 
dynamics and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own 
locality, supporting hypotheses five and six.  
3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the ALP on Human Security 
Overall, in the case of the ALP, the government’s decision to employ a pro-
government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. While there were some 
areas where the ALP was reported to have raised the level of human security for Afghan 
citizens, many ALP units were reported to have preyed on the population due to a lack of 
governmental accountability towards the ALP. Additionally, abuses against the civilian 
population increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by the government’s 
enhancement of the ALP’s power and the abuses were worse in areas where the ALP 
operated outside of their assigned area. This supports hypotheses five and six. Overall, in 
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the case of the ALP, the impacts of a pro-government militia on human security are 
negative.  
F. THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE IN KUNDUZ PROVINCE 
The implementation of the ALP in Kunduz clearly demonstrates some of the major 
challenges of establishing an ALP in areas that contained preexisting negative group 
dynamics, specifically a long history of ethnic rivalries, to ALP success. For example, one 
issue facing the ALP in Kunduz was significant ethnic diversity. Kunduz province contains 
a mixture of “Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, Arab, Baluch, Hazara and Turkmen communities”; 
however, Tajiks and Uzbeks are the two predominant ethnicities in the province.131 
Furthermore, Kunduz borders Tajikistan to the north, and this has led to an increase in 
inter-ethnicity mixing resulting from multiple waves of immigration.132 Overall, the 
implementation of the ALP would be overlaid over an increasingly diverse community, 
challenging the ALP from the beginning, because the ALP would use the power 
enhancement from the government to confront historical rivalries. 
 Initially, the first ALP was established in Kunduz province in the fall of 2011, and 
consisted of approximately 225 ALP members in Kunduz district.133 By the summer of 
2014, the ALP in Kunduz had continued to grow with 250 members in Kunduz District, 
195 in Aliabad, 300 in Imam Sahib, and 300 in Chardara.134 Nevertheless, the ALP in 
Kunduz had difficulties in conducting balanced recruiting, specifically, lacking Pashtuns.135 
Additionally, United States SOF mentorship was also limited in Kunduz when compared 
to other regions. For example, Felbab-Brown reports that while in some areas it was 
common for the ALP to have SOF provide six weeks of mentorship on site, the ALP units 
in Kunduz were only visited once a week.136 Ultimately, this started the ALP on poor 
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footing, and the International Crisis Group assessed that “in the four districts where it was 
first introduced, violence increased 25 to 30 per cent from 2010 to 2014. By comparison, 
the two districts of the province entirely without ALP had no increase during the same 
period.”137 
Most of the major incidents surrounding the ALP were results of either a lack of 
effective command and control from GIROA or attacks from the predominantly Tajik ALP 
towards Pashtuns. For example, the International Crisis Group reported a case of an MoI 
member frustrated with the lack of control of rogue ALP members, and he is quoted saying, 
“we can’t really manage them. We just deliver their salaries.”138 Additionally, Human 
Rights Watch has reported multiple cases of militias in Kunduz conducting “killings, rape, 
beatings, and extortion.”139 
Ultimately, the culmination of the ALPs failures came in the spring offensive of 
2015. Specifically, leading up to 2015, the ALP had been pushed out of significant 
checkpoints surrounding Kunduz by local villagers tired of ALP abuse.140 For example, the 
International Crisis Group reported that “in Chardara district, villagers forced the ALP 
from an outpost where the members were accused of killing, maiming and disrespecting 
the locals.”141 Consequentially, in the spring of 2015, the Taliban utilized the absence of 
the checkpoints leading into Kunduz in conjunction with the neutrality created by ALP 
predation to set siege to Kunduz.142 Ultimately, the ALP in Kunduz had such a strong 
negative impact on both state security and human security that two battalions of ANA were 
deployed to Kunduz to save the city from falling into the Taliban’s hands, and the 
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conventional forces would be tasked with correcting the negative impacts that the ALP had 
left on both the state and the population.143   
G. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, President Karzai established the ALP with the intention of securing the 
gaps left by both the ANA and ANP; however, the impacts of the ALP program on state 
and human security has been mixed at best. The ALP had the greatest positive impact on 
state security and stability when they operated within the local area that they were recruit 
from and in a locality that was devoid of any major destabilizing group dynamics, such as 
competing ethnicities; conversely, there are many cases where they negatively impacted 
security and stability due to deviation from the ALP’s guidelines of remaining local, or the 
ALP being established in an area that was not suitable for their deployment. Similarly, 
there were some areas where the ALP is reported to have raised the level of human security 
for Afghan citizens; nonetheless, many militias were reported to have preyed on the 
population due to a lack of accountability. Additionally, abuses on the civilian population 
increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by the ALP’s power enhancement, 
eventually causing, in some cases, the locals to push them out, leaving room for the Taliban 
to overtake the community.  
Ultimately, hypotheses one, five, and six were supported by the ALP case, and the 
relationships tested in questions two and three where further defined. Specifically, to 
address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a cost-
effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of 
insurgent groups.”144 This action by the GIRoA supports hypothesis one which suggest that 
states align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a 
cheaper cost than traditional force employment. Similarly, both hypotheses five and six 
which focus on the importance of pro-government militias operating and recruiting within 
                                                 
143 The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 17.  
144 Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.  
 37
its locality, and the impact of the predisposition of the local area on the effectiveness of the 
pro-government militia were also supported. For example, in the case of the ALP, the 
positive impact of a pro-government militia on both state and human security depended 
upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative 
group dynamics and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their 
own locality. Finally, the ALP case further defined questions two and three of this thesis 
which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security. First, 
the ALP’s impact on state security and stability varies greatly across the country’s regions 
which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review, and 
second, the government’s decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a 
decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these 
findings against the findings in the next chapter on the Janjaweed to determine the 
differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government 
militia.  
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III. THE JANJAWEED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to examine the impact an informal pro-government militia can have on 
state and human security; this chapter describes and analyzes how the Janjaweed militia 
impacted the government and citizens of Sudan from 2003–2005. In the summer of 2003, 
the Government of Sudan (GoS) began robust counterinsurgency operations in Darfur, the 
western region of Sudan. Utilizing the government’s ground and air forces, in conjunction 
with Janjaweed Arab militiamen, the GoS attempted to quell a growing militant insurgency 
in Darfur that was fueled by decades of political and financial marginalization.145 As a result 
of the conflict, and via what Sectary of State Colin Powell described as a joint GoS and 
Janjaweed “scorched-earth policy towards the rebels and the African civilian 
population,”146 more than 70,000 civilians were killed, over 400 villages were completely 
destroyed, and more than 1.8 million citizens were displaced.147 
Historically, in order to establish and protect national security in Sudan, 
governments have relied on locally based militias or security groups to defeat rebel 
insurgencies.148 This chapter examines the Janjaweed, an informal pro-government militia 
that was utilized heavily by the GoS from 2003—2005 with the goal of defeating and 
removing all rebel elements from Darfur.149 A goal which the GoS did not accomplish. In 
comparison to the semi-official pro-government militia outlined in the previous chapter, it 
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is important to remember throughout this chapter that an informal pro-government militia 
is defined as a pro-government militia that has an informal relationship with a government, 
which may or may not be widely known and acknowledged.150 The Janjaweed meets these 
requirements. In order to test the hypotheses outlined in chapter one, this thesis is outlined 
in four sections. First, the chapter looks at the history of both Darfur and the use of pro-
government militias in Sudan to establish a precedent for how the GoS used militias in the 
past. Second, the chapter details the events leading up to the Sudanese decision to utilize 
the Janjaweed in Darfur in the early 2000s. Third, the chapter examines the impact of the 
Janjaweed on state security and human security. And, finally, the chapter provides some 
final analysis, discussion, and conclusion. 
 Ultimately, the decision by the GoS to employ the Janjaweed was extremely 
detrimental to human security, and the impacts of the Janjaweed on state security were 
mixed. Hypotheses one and six were supported by the Janjaweed case, and the relationships 
tested in questions two and three where further defined. Specifically, the GoS decided to 
unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy 
losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS 
with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-
effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the only motivator for their employment.  
The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the 
deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving 
military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through 
conventional forces alone. Similarly, the Janjaweed case supports hypothesis six which 
focuses on the impact of localized group-dynamics on the effectiveness of the pro-
government militia. For example, there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively 
impacted state and human security because the governments’ employment of the Janjaweed 
intensified the area’s preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or 
resource-based rivalries. Finally, the Janjaweed case further defines questions two and 
three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and 
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human security. First, the Janjaweed’s impact on state security and stability varied 
throughout the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on 
hypothesis two in the literature review, and second, the government’s decision to employ 
a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter 
of this thesis will compare these findings against the findings in the previous chapter on 
the ALP to determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an 
informal pro-government militia.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. A Brief History of Darfur 
In order to understand how the employment of the Janjaweed impacted state and 
human security, it will be useful to first layout a brief history of Darfur, Khartoum’s militia 
use, and the conflict which contextually framed the GoS’s decision-making throughout the 
conflict presented in this case study. In 1916, Darfur, Sudan’s western-most region, became 
part of the British Empire after three hundred years of independence.151 At that time, Dar 
Fur, as described by Flint and De Waal, was “one of the most powerful kingdoms in a 
string of such states positioned on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, trading with the 
Mediterranean and raiding its southern neighbours.”152 Over the next 70 years, the original 
inhabitants of Darfur peacefully and willingly integrated into the Sudanese culture and 
population.153  
During the 1980s, conflicts in Darfur became more violent.154 The chief complaint 
of the people of Darfur in the 1980s was not the loss of independence and culture that was 
associated with becoming Sudanese; rather, it was that they felt marginalized by the central 
government due to a lack of being treated as full citizens of the state.155 Furthermore, in a 
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resource-based conflict between the Fur and the Arabs from 1987–1989, militants first 
began to self-identify as “Arabs” vs “non-Arabs.”156 The International Crisis group 
explains: 
The conflict began at a very limited level among some camel herding Arab 
tribes in Northern Darfur and some sectors of the Fur in the northern part of 
Jebel Mara but it quickly degenerated as a result of the meddling of the 
politicized elements [of both groups] in Darfur’s towns and “Darfur 
intellectuals” in Khartoum. Propaganda, particularly in the Khartoum 
media, intensified and stoked the fighting until it drew all the sectors of the 
Fur on one side and all the Arab tribes on the other.157 
Throughout the conflict, an alliance of 27 Arab tribes worked together for the first 
time to counter the non-Arabs, particularly the Fur.158 Similarly, the Fur created their own 
militias in order to defend their population from the perceived aggression of the Arab 
militias at that time.159 Additionally, this was the first time the Fur labeled the Arab nomad 
militias as Janjaweed, which roughly translates to “evil men on horseback.”160 In the end, 
the conflict between the Fur and the Arab militias resulted in at least 2,500 Fur fatalities 
and 500 Arab fatalities with hundreds of villages or camps destroyed on each side.161  
Darfur contained over 6 million people at the onset of the conflict and consisted of 
almost one fifth of Sudan’s territory prior to South Sudan’s referendum for independence 
in 2011.162 Darfur’s population is overwhelmingly Muslim and comprises a combination of 
both Arab and non-Arab ethnicities.163 Throughout Darfur, the predominant non-Arab 
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ethnic group is the Fur, but other non-Arab ethnic groups also operate throughout Darfur, 
such as the Zaghawa, Massalit, and Daju.164  
2. A History of Militia Use and Khartoum’s Militia Strategy 
Khartoum’s extensive use of pro-government militias began in 1985, in response 
to offensive operations being conducted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
in southern Sudan.165 The GoS realized that by manipulating preexisting tribal or societal 
fractures with monetary, political, or military aid, it could successfully turn numerous 
neutral groups residing in southern Sudan against the SPLA.166 Initially, the GoS viewed 
the pro-government militias as a force multiplier that would allow the GoS to conserve 
their own troops, but as the GoS continued to utilize pro-government militias, its leaders 
realized that militias provided the GoS with plausible deniability.167 Militias allowed 
Khartoum to broadcast to the international community that there was no real war going on 
and that the conflict was chiefly local/ tribal conflict, while at the same time the GoS 
utilized the militias to conduct offensive operations outside of the purview of the 
international community.168 Overall, the GoS viewed pro-government militias in the south 
as a key offensive element in their strategy of achieving regime security, because the pro-
government militias effectively defeated the enemy and served as deniable force, allowing 
the GoS to utilize significant levels of violence without fear of consequences from the 
international community.  
Since then, the GoS has leveraged the practicality, effectiveness, and deniability of 
pro-government militias in a majority of recent conflicts, and the level of violence ratcheted 
up when the government employed militias in Darfur.169 For example, in 2003, the 
leadership from Khartoum implemented a strategy in Darfur that would utilize 
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governmental forces in conjunction with the Janjaweed to annihilate the rebel Sudan 
Liberation Movement/ Army (SLA) and the Justice Equity Movement (JEM) forces and 
their supporters in Darfur.170 Ultimately, the GoS decision to utilize the Janjaweed from 
2003–2005 resulted in one of the worst conflicts in Sudan’s history, outlined in the 
following sections.  
3. Factors Leading to 2003 Conflict 
Throughout Darfur’s history with Sudan, there have been many cases of popular 
opposition rebel movements against the government in Khartoum, and the 2003 uprisings 
by the SLA and the JEM are just the most recent.171 Similar to previous conflicts in Darfur, 
this crisis was rooted in resource scarcity, overlaid with Arab vs non-Arab ideology; 
however, unlike previous conflicts, the importance of twenty years of unequal policies 
from Khartoum toward the region also influenced the 2003 crisis.172 Following the conflict 
between the Fur and the Arabs in 1989, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir had 
approved the recommendations from a peace conference organized by the belligerents of 
the conflict; however, the central government continued implementing policies that 
marginalized the area, specifically the non-Arab ethnicities.173 As a result, conflicts 
continued in the region, leading to another reconciliation conference between the Arab and 
non-Arabs in 2002, chaired by the GoS, which the residents of Darfur “criticized as flawed 
and did not lead to a sustainable settlement.”174 Correspondingly, employment of the 
Janjaweed over the above negative localized group dynamics is important to testing 
hypothesis six of this thesis in the following sections. 
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One of the factors leading to the conflict in 2003 was the marginalization of the 
population of Darfur. Like many areas outside of Khartoum and the fertile Nile river 
valleys, the central government has marginalized the area by providing a lack of 
infrastructure, development, and economic resources.175 Additionally, major administrative 
restructuring in 1994 led to policies that further divided the area. First, in 1994, the central 
government placed many Arabs into positions of power throughout Darfur, a move viewed 
as an attempt by the non-Arabs of Darfur to further marginalize their population and 
challenge their traditional power.176 Also in 1994, the central government divided the region 
of Darfur into three states: Northern, Southern, and Western Darfur; this division ultimately 
split the Fur into multiple administrative authorities, weakening their position in the 
government.177  
Yet, another factor leading into the conflict was the arming of the Arab militias by 
the central government in conjunction with the mindset of Arab supremacism. Prior to the 
conflict in 2003, the Darfur region had experienced many years of significant weapons 
proliferation.178 Specifically, since 1986, the GoS had viewed arming the Arab militias in 
Darfur as a viable strategy to countering SPLA actions the region, and the proliferation of 
weapons also served as a significant destabilizing factor in the region.179 The weapons the 
government intended to be used against possible SPLA advancements were also used 
against the Fur and other non-Arab ethnicities in Darfur, resulting in many deadly conflicts 
from the late 1980s through the 1990s.180 
Thus, over the past several decades, the combination of negative local dynamics, 
such as drought, scarce recourses, poor governance, ethnic marginalization, and the 
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proliferation of weapons to the area, primed the Darfur region for conflict.181 In the early 
2000s, lawlessness increased in Darfur, and in response, the governors of Darfur “issued a 
decree establishing a state of emergency in the region, instituting Special Courts to try 
people convicted of illegal possession or smuggling of weapons, murder and armed 
robbery.”182 However, the level of violence did not decrease in response to these new 
policies; indeed in 2003, the violence escalated to an unprecedented level.183 In February 
of that year, the Fur argued that the GoS’s policies were not working to stop violence in 
the region and called for the GoS “to establish an independent and impartial Commission 
of Inquiry into the complex causes for the violence and human rights abuses in Darfur”; 
however, the GoS did not answer their call, and so the SLA and JEM “took up arms.”184 
C. THE DECISION TO EMPLOY THE JANJAWEED 
The increasing tensions outlined above turned to armed conflict in the beginning of 
2003, and by April of that year, the GoS had implemented a multi-faceted strategy to 
include utilizing the Janjaweed militia to deter and defeat the SLA and JEM rebels in 
Darfur.185 In September of 2003, the government and the rebels would sign a ceasefire; 
nevertheless, multiple reports indicated that fighting continued.186 The following section 
includes an overview of the onset of the conflict, the decision for why the GoS decided to 
utilize the Janjaweed, and the overall tactics and strategy employed by the GoS and the 
Janjaweed. Overall, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the 
onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and 
utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, 
supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the 
only motivator for their employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in 
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Darfur, because both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided 
the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult 
to achieve through conventional forces alone. Therefore, the Janjaweed case supports 
hypothesis one, with the caveat that there were other major factors, such as the deniability, 
“out of control” nature, and the demonstrated success of militias in the south, that led the 
GoS to employ the Janjaweed.  
Consequentially, the conflict in Darfur is still ongoing today and has resulted in 
more than 70,000 civilian fatalities, over 400 destroyed villages, and more than 1.8 million 
displaced citizens.187 
1. Onset of the Conflict and the Impact of Early Governmental Losses 
In order to understand why the GoS decided to utilized the Janjaweed, it is first 
important to understand that at the onset of the conflict the rebels were causing significant 
loses to Khartoum’s conventional forces, and these losses initially framed the GoS decision 
to utilize the Janjaweed. Fighting in Darfur first began in February of 2003, when the SLA 
and JEM attacked governmental quarters in response to decades of marginalization and 
poor governance from Khartoum.188 Initially, on 18 March 2003, the governor of the 
Northern Darfur state, General Ibrahim Sulieman, initiated a temporary peace between the 
rebel movements and the GoS; however, things changed after Arab militiamen ambushed 
a prominent Masalit sheikh, Saleh Dakoro.189 Saleh Dakoro left Darfur for medical 
treatment in Khartoum after the ambush, but he would later die in Khartoum after calling 
relatives and telling them that he would return to Darfur in days.190 Upon Dakoro’s death, 
Flint and De Waal explain, “the word spread like wildfire: the grand old man of the Masalit, 
wounded by the militias in Darfur, had been murdered by the government in Khartoum”; 
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his death confirmed to the rebels in Darfur that the government was removing the 
opposition, and they determined to continue to take up arms and escalate the conflict.191  
On April 25, 2003, the JEM and the SLA conducted the most successful attack of 
the conflict against the GoS, an attack that would change the level of engagement from the 
GoS.192 For the first three months of the conflict, the SLA and JEM defeated Khartoum’s 
forces on the battlefield, as the GoS’s soldiers were not used to fighting in a desert 
environment; however, the rebel forces were taking significant casualties from Sudan’s air 
force.193 Otherwise powerless against the aircraft, a force of 317 SLA and JEM militants 
attacked al Fasher airbase when the aircraft were on the ground, killing more than 70 GoS 
soldiers and pilots; destroying seven GoS military aircraft; capturing the head of the 
Sudanese Air Force, Major General Ibrahim Bushra Ismail; and acquiring multiple mortars, 
120mm anti-aircraft guns, and military vehicles.194 Flint and De Wall explain that “in more 
than twenty years’ war in the south, the SPLA had never inflicted such a loss on the air 
force. The rebels were jubilant. ‘The attack changed everything.’”195  
Until the attacks against al Fasher airbase, the GoS had publically described the 
conflict in Darfur as a local/tribal conflict; however, the strength of the attack on the airbase 
demonstrated to the government in Khartoum that the rebels were a legitimate military 
threat and that the GoS risked losing Darfur if its military strategy did not change.196 
Consequentially, the GoS denied any political settlements to the rebels, fully mobilized the 
military in Darfur, fired General Suleiman, and greatly expanded the recruitment of the 
Janjaweed.197 These actions resulted in the bloodiest years of the whole conflict in Darfur, 
from 2003–2005.198  
                                                 
191 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2064–2072. 
192 Amnesty International, Sudan, 2.  
193 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2081–2084. 
194 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2114–2119. 
195 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2120–2121. 
196 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2122–2124, 2132. 
197 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2127–2128, 2140–2142. 
198 Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2142. 
 49
2. The Benefit of the Janjaweed’s Deniability and “Out of Control” 
Nature to the GoS 
In conjunction with the heavy losses inflicted on the GoS’s conventional forces at 
the onset of the conflict, the GoS also viewed the deniability and the “out of control” nature 
of the Janjaweed as a key asset to achieving military objectives that would have been 
significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone and expounding 
upon the relationship tested in question one of this thesis. The following sections explain 
the origins of the Janjaweed which shows why the GoS viewed the Janjaweed as a plausible 
partner for both violence and increasing stability. Overall, the GoS viewed the Janjaweed 
as a key offensive element in their strategy of achieving regime security, because the pro-
government militias could defeat elements of the rebel forces and served as deniable force, 
allowing the GoS to utilize significant levels of violence without the fear of consequences 
from the international community.  
 The Janjaweed militias include multiple nomad Arab militia groups. A Human 
Rights Watch report explains that most Janjaweed are recruited from “camel-herding 
nomads who migrated to Darfur from Chad and West Africa in the 1970s, and from Arab 
camel-herding tribes from North Darfur.”199 The International Crisis Group explains that 
the Janjaweed militias draw on the history of the “Hambati,” who were Arab social 
bandits.200 The GoS, fully aware of the “raider culture” of the Janjaweed and the ethnic 
dynamics and tensions in Darfur, decided to employ the Janjaweed to augment their 
traditional military forces in the area.201Although many of Khartoum’s official calls for 
militia recruitment solicited any and all help to defeat the insurgency, the GoS specifically 
targeted the Janjaweed based on the militias’ history of conflict with the ethnic groups that 
made up the SLA and JEM.202  
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In order to recruit the Janjaweed, the GoS offered multiple incentives and 
significant military support to the militias: specifically, the government offered “payment 
and access to loot, as well as promises of access to land and administrative power”203 
Militarily, the GoS is reported by multiple organizations to have provided the Janjaweed 
with small arms, military uniforms, transportation, fire support, communication equipment, 
money, and food.204 
Throughout the conflict, the government’s official recognition of its support of the 
Janjaweed was inconsistent. Most official media statements from Khartoum strongly deny 
any formal relationship with or support for the Janjaweed.205 In December of 2003, 
however, President al-Bashir reframed the objectives of the campaign in Darfur and the 
utilization of pro-government militias, contradicting the official denial: “our priority from 
now on is to eliminate the rebellion, and any outlaw element is our target … We will use 
the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the horsemen to get rid of the rebellion.”206 While al-
Bashir did not specifically refer to the Janjaweed by name, both “the mujahedeen” and “the 
horsemen” are colloquial or possibly code terms that refer to the Janjaweed. Regardless of 
Sudan’s official denial that it supports the Janjaweed, multiple studies and reports by the 
International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department establish 
irrefutable coordination and support between the Janjaweed and the GoS.207  
Correspondingly, throughout this latest conflict, the GoS have implemented their 
strategies and tactics for achieving regime security through two parallel lines of effort, the 
Janjaweed and the military; the majority of the tactics used by the GoS were initially 
developed and refined against the SPLA in the south.208 Specifically, the GoS has used 
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tactics such as “aerial bombardment, the recruitment of ethnic militias as proxy ground 
forces, forced displacement—on an ethnic basis—of rural civilians on a massive scale, and 
persecution of real or perceived political opposition,” in both campaigns.209 In the majority 
of the clashes between the government and the rebel forces a similar pattern of events 
occurs. First, the GoS would bomb the rebel villages from the air. Second, the GoS forces 
would arrive in vehicles, trailed by the Janjaweed on horses or camels. Third, the forces 
would surround and enter the villages. Fourth, fleeing villagers would be targeted by both 
the ground and air forces. And finally, the GoS forces and the Janjaweed loot and destroy 
the village.210 Therefore, throughout many steps of operations, the GoS utilized the 
Janjaweed as a key asset to achieving military objectives that would have been significantly 
more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone.  
3. Analysis of Why the GoS Decided to Utilize the Janjaweed 
Overall, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset 
of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing 
the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting 
hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the only motivator 
for their employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because 
both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in 
achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve 
through conventional forces alone. Therefore, the Janjaweed case supports hypothesis one, 
with the caveat that there were other major factors, such as the deniability, “out of control” 
nature, and the demonstrated success of militias in the south, that led the GoS to employ 
the Janjaweed.  
D. THE IMPACT OF THE JANJAWEED ON STATE SECURITY 
Overall, the Janjaweed’s impact on state security and stability varied throughout 
the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in 
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the literature review. Correspondingly, the following section provides examples of where 
the Janjaweed had both positive and negative impacts, and like the literature review cannot 
specifically determine an overall positive or negative impact. In some instances, the 
employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military 
objectives temporarily increasing regime and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS 
employment of the Janjaweed had some negative consequences towards state security: the 
increased involvement of the international community, a lack of accountability, and further 
instability, both within and outside of Darfur. The following section provides both the 
positive and negative impacts of the GoS utilizing the Janjaweed in Sudan.  
1. A Case for a Positive Impact 
At the beginning of the conflict, the Janjaweed provided the GoS with a deniable 
force multiplier that aided the GoS in achieving military objectives in Darfur, and therefore, 
increased state security by defeating rebel movements. In most of the engagements in 
Darfur, the Janjaweed were an integral part in operations, and the catastrophes the 
Janjaweed caused were deliberate.211 A Human Rights Watch reported that on 24 April 
2004, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail conceded that in some cases the 
GoS worked in conjunction with the Janjaweed, because the Janjaweed’s basis for 
conducting attacks “was a just one.”212 He explained, “the government may have turned a 
blind eye toward the militias…This is true. Because those militias are targeting the 
rebellion.”213 Similarly, the GoS often argued that the militias in Darfur were “out of 
control”; however, the “out of control” mentality provided the government with what they 
believed to be a deniable agent to conduct mass killings and displacements in Darfur.214 
Moreover, during the conflict, the government often denied any formal ties to the 
Janjaweed and overwhelmingly tried to limit the information available to the international 
community about their support. Specifically, the government, throughout 2003, banned the 
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Khartoum Monitor, Al-Jazeera and Al-Ayam to control the flow of information leaving 
from the capital, further protecting the deniability of the government’s support for the 
Janjaweed.215 Overall, both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed 
aided the GoS in achieving military objectives in Darfur, and these objectives helped defeat 
the threat from the SLA and JEM that emanated from Darfur.  
2. A Case for a Negative Impact 
Although the use of Janjaweed aided the GoS in fighting the rebel movement in 
Darfur and resulted in temporary increases in security, the utilization of the Janjaweed, in 
some cases, negatively impacted regime security for the GoS. The following section 
continues to evaluate question two on how pro-government militias affect a state’s 
monopoly of force and overall stability arguing that the Janjaweed negatively impacted the 
security and stability of Sudan due to an significant increase in the amount of attention 
brought onto the domestic crisis from the international community, threating Sudan’s 
monopoly of force, and inability of the GoS to control some Janjaweed members due to 
utilizing the Janjaweed over an area that contained negative local dynamics, such as 
preexisting ethnic and resource-based conflict, supporting hypothesis six. 
a. A Loss of the GoS Monopoly of Force 
As the International community perceived the Janjaweed’s violence to be 
increasing, many actors in the community called for Sudan to act against the militias.216 
Specifically, in 2004, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1556 
mandated that, “the Government of Sudan fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed 
militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have 
incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and 
other atrocities.”217 The UNSC resolution also endorsed and fully supported the deployment 
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of African Union troops to Darfur to monitor the situation.218 Eventually, these actions 
would by the international community would make it more difficult for the GoS to continue 
to implement their strategy of “annihilation,” and the presence of foreign troops in the 
country undermines the GoS sovereignty in the region. Overall, due to the action of the 
Janjaweed in Darfur, the international community began to dictate some of Sudan’s 
domestic actions, threatening the GoS monopoly of force.  
b. Preexisting Group Dynamics Impact on the Janjaweed 
This next section examines the impact of preexisting negative group dynamics on 
the ALP’s ability to increase state security in order to test hypothesis six. In many cases, 
the negative impacts of the Janjaweed were greatly intensified by the region’s preexisting 
negative group dynamics, because the Janjaweed utilized the authority provided from the 
government to target previous competitors, sometimes beyond the intentions of the GoS. 
For example, while the government benefited from the employment of the Janjaweed, in 
some instances the intentions of the Janjaweed did not match the goals of the GoS. The 
GoS intention in Darfur was to defeat the rebellion while not disturbing the negotiations 
going on with the South; however, the Janjaweed desired more, Flint and De Waal explain 
that “many Arab militiamen wanted more: to take possession of Fur and Masalit lands, if 
not by emptying them of their inhabitants then by killing their chiefs and installing their 
own.”219 Ultimately, this divergence in interest led to a principal—agent dilemma where 
Khartoum did not have complete control of the Janjaweed in Darfur. Therefore, in some 
cases in Darfur, the impacts of a pro-government militia on state security depended upon 
the ability of the state to control the militia, and in some cases the presence of preexisting 
negative group dynamics limited that control, supporting hypothesis six.  
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3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the Janjaweed on State Security 
Overall, the Janjaweed’s impact on state security and stability varied throughout 
the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in 
the literature review. In some instances, the employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS 
ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military objectives temporarily increasing regime 
and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS employment of the Janjaweed had some negative 
consequences towards state security: the increased involvement of the international 
community, a lack of accountability, and further instability, both within and outside of 
Darfur. Therefore, in the case of the Janjaweed, the impacts of a pro-government militia 
on state security are indeterminate.  
E. THE IMPACT OF THE JANJAWEED ON HUMAN SECURITY 
In order to determine the impact of a pro-government militia on human security and 
investigate question three of this thesis, the following section investigate the impacts of the 
Janjaweed on human security. Ultimately, the decision by the GoS to support and 
coordinate with the Janjaweed in Darfur has had exceptionally grave consequences on 
human security. Furthermore, throughout the conflict in Darfur, the non-Arab civilian 
population took the most casualties and paid the biggest price for the conflict due to a 
government sponsored intensification of previous rivalries between the Janjaweed and the 
non-Arab civilian population.220 This supports hypothesis six which suggest that employing 
a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a 
history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of 
a negative impacts on state and human security. Throughout the worst years of the conflict 
from 2003–2004, the actions and tactics by the GoS and the Janjaweed caused over 200,000 
non-combatant casualties and displaced millions of residents from Darfur.221 Overall, the 
unrestricted nature of the Janjaweed’s mass oppression and victimization towards the non-
Arab tribes resulted in massive atrocities throughout Darfur; consequently, it is difficult to 
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find any reported instances of where the impact of the Janjaweed resulted in a net positive 
impact on human security.222  
1. Example Cases and Characterizations of Human Rights Violations  
Throughout Sudan, the Janjaweed has been responsible for many different human 
rights violations. In 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell in an address to U.S. Senate 
outlined that throughout Darfur, there was a “consistent and widespread pattern of 
atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by jinjaweid [sic] and 
government forces against non-Arab villagers.”223 Similarly, Kofi Annan, the United 
Nations Secretary General explained that he was “alarmed at the rapidly deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, and by reports of widespread 
abuses against civilians, including killings, rape and the burning and looting of entire 
villages.”224 Detailed below are some examples of Janjaweed’s impact on human security: 
 A 2004 International Crisis Group report detailed that on February 27 2004, 
a joint GoS and Janjaweed attack on North Darfur resulted in the murder of 
67 civilians, kidnapping of 16 schoolgirls, and the rape of 93 others.225 
Furthermore, in the same report, it was reported that “the Janjaweed branded 
those they raped on their hands to mark them permanently and ostracize 
them from society.”226 Overall, the attack resulted in a complete destruction 
of the town. 
 A 2004 Amnesty International report detailed that on July 28, in Meramta, 
more than 300 people were killed by the GoS and Janjaweed. In the same 
report, it was reported that after the initial attack, women trying to flee were 
beaten by the Janjaweed and homes were destroyed. Meramta, a village of 
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over 450 households, was reported to Amnesty International to be 
completely empty.227  
 Julie Flint and Alex de Waal report that extreme sexual violence and rape 
also occurred at the hands of the Janjaweed throughout Darfur. In one 
instance, “a young Zaghawa woman called Mariam Ahmad was stopped at 
a roadblock and forced to watch while Janjawiid [sic] cut the penis off her 
three-week-old son, Ahmad. The child died soon after in her arms.”228 In 
another attack, the Janjaweed raped Hobu Izhaq Azrak over seven days; 
after the rape, she was tied to her dead brother, who was killed by the 
Janjaweed, and both were set on fire.229 In another attack in Bargai, the 
Janjaweed reportedly sexually abused a new mother of twins following 
childbirth; after the attack, the Janjaweed killed the infants by putting them 
in boiling water.230  
Ultimately, violations like these by the Janjaweed, greatly decrease the overall human 
security in Sudan.  
2. The Importance of the Locality and Localized Group Dynamics 
Throughout Sudan, the preexisting localized group dynamics, such as ethnic and 
resource competition, greatly impacted the level of predation of the Janjaweed on the 
population, supporting hypothesis six. For example, Darfur’s topography is challenging, 
consisting of vast deserts and steep mountains. Furthermore, Darfur has a very arid climate 
and a dearth of arable land, which has increased resource scarcity, increasing competition 
and resource-based conflict in the region.231 In 2004, the United States State Department 
argued that “the competition for scarce resources over the years has contributed to recurring 
conflict between nomadic Arab herders and non-Arab farmers, particularly over land and 
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grazing rights. Various ethnic groups have fought over access to water, grazing rights, and 
prized agricultural land as desertification has driven herders farther south.”232 For multiple 
generations, conflicts between and within the Arab and non-Arab ethnicities have been 
based on the access to and usage of resources such as land, water, and livestock; however, 
until the 1980s, these conflicts were generally infrequent and maintained a low level of 
violence.233 Correspondingly, there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively 
impacted human security, because the government’s employment of the Janjaweed 
intensified the area’s preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or 
resource based rivalries. Therefore, in the case of the Janjaweed, the level of impact of a 
pro-government militia on human security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy 
the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics, supporting hypothesis 
six.  
3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the Janjaweed on Human Security 
Overall, in the case of the Janjaweed, the government’s decision to employ a pro-
government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. Additionally, abuses 
against the civilian population increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by 
the government’s enhancement of the Janjaweed’s power, supporting hypothesis six. 
Overall, in the case of the Janjaweed, the impacts of a pro-government militia on human 
security are negative.  
F. CONCLUSION  
The GoS recruited the Janjaweed to defeat and deter the rebel movements of the 
SLA and JEM in Darfur; however, the impacts of the Janjaweed on state security were 
mixed, and the impacts of the Janjaweed on and human security were exceptionally grave. 
The Janjaweed’s greatest impact towards state security and stability was their ability to 
augment the conventional Sudanese forces; nevertheless, the Janjaweed’s level of violence 
resulted in Sudan garnering more international inquiry into Sudanese domestic operations 
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than they wanted. Similarly, the decision of Khartoum to employ the Janjaweed resulted in 
terrible consequences to Human Security in the region.   
Ultimately, hypotheses one and six were supported by the Janjaweed case, and the 
relationships tested in questions two and three where further defined. Specifically, the GoS 
decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels 
inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would 
provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, 
the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the only motivator for their employment. 
The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and 
the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives 
that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces 
alone. Similarly, hypothesis six which focus the impact of the predisposition of the local 
area on the effectiveness of the pro-government militia was also supported. For example, 
there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively impacted state and human security, 
because the government’s employment of the Janjaweed intensified the area’s preexisting 
negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or resource-based rivalries. Finally, the 
Janjaweed case further defines questions two and three of this thesis which focus on the 
impact of pro-government militias on state and human security. First, the Janjaweed’s 
impact on state security and stability varied throughout the timeline of the conflict which 
supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review, and second, 
the government’s decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in 
overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these findings against 
the findings in the previous chapter on the ALP to determine the differences between a 
state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government militia. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND OVERALL 
IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, the intention of this thesis was to investigate the impacts of pro-
government militias on state and human security by researching and comparing two recent 
case studies. The concluding chapter is broken into two major sections. First, the chapter 
intends to outline the conclusions identified in chapter two and three, and then draw the 
comparisons across the two cases. Furthermore, section d. of the following section intends 
to test hypothesis four which suggest that the more official and transparent the ties are 
between the pro-government militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-
government militia is to the state and human security. And, second, the thesis concludes 
with a discussion on the overall implications of the analysis.  
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
1.  Research Questions and Hypothesis Evaluated  
a. Why do states align themselves with pro-government militias?  
Based on the literature reviewed, this thesis initially hypothesized that states align 
themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a cheaper cost than 
traditional force employment, and in both case studies it is apparent that cost did play a 
factor. However, there were many other contributing factors in both cases as well. 
Specifically, to address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the 
Afghan government decided to create the ALP as a cost-effective method to “secure local 
communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups.”234 However, 
other factors such as pressure from the United States to utilize militias as a 
counterinsurgency strategy, and a strong history of militia use contributed to the decision 
to employ the ALP as well. Similarly, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, 
because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional 
forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective 
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solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed 
wasn’t the only motivator for its employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the 
Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the 
Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been 
significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Overall, states 
likely do align themselves with pro-government militias because it is more cost effective, 
but as demonstrated in the two case studies, there are likely many other reasons as well that 
drive states to employ militias.  
b. How do pro-government militias affect a state’s monopoly of force and 
overall stability? 
The literature reviewed actively debates the impact of pro-government militia on a 
state’s monopoly of force and overall stability. Initially this thesis intended to clarify this 
relationship by investigating the impacts of the ALP and Janjaweed on a state’s monopoly 
of force and overall stability. After conducting the research, however, the impact of a pro-
government militia on state security is still indeterminate. In the case of the ALP, the ALP 
had the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when they operated in close 
accordance to their guidelines in a locality that was predominantly ethnically homogenous 
and absent of preexisting negative group dynamics supports follow on hypotheses five and 
six; conversely, there are many cases where the ALP negatively impacted security and 
stability, because they deviated from the ALP’s guidelines, or the GIRoA established the 
ALP in an area that contained preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of 
ethnic or resource-based conflict. Similarly, the impact of the Janjaweed had mixed results 
on state stability. In some instances, the employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS 
ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military objectives temporarily increasing regime 
and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS employment of the Janjaweed had some negative 
consequences towards state security: the increased involvement of the international 
community, a lack of accountability, and further instability, both within and outside of 
Darfur. Overall, states can improve their security and stability through the use of pro-
government militias, yet as demonstrated in the two cases compared, there are likely to be 
some negative impacts when a government delegates security to militias.  
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c. How does the presence of pro-government militias impact overall human 
security?  
The literature reviewed actively debates the impact of pro-government militia on a 
state’s monopoly of force and overall stability. Therefore, this thesis intended to clarify 
this relationship by investigating the impacts of the ALP and Janjaweed on human security, 
and overall, in both cases, the utilization of a pro-government militia negatively impacted 
human security. In Afghanistan, there were some areas where the ALP was reported to 
have raised the level of human security for Afghan citizens; nonetheless, many ALP units 
were reported to have preyed on the population due to a lack of governmental 
accountability towards the ALP. In Sudan, the literature review did not provide any cases 
in which the Janjaweed benefited human security; conversely, the employment of the 
Janjaweed in Sudan had unimaginable consequences on human security in and around 
Darfur. Overall, in the two cases studied, it was overwhelmingly apparent that the presence 
of pro-government militias greatly decreases human security, underlining a key finding 
that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia 
employment and human security.  
d.  How does the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government 
militia influence state security and human security?  
This thesis initially hypothesized that the more official and transparent the ties are 
between the pro-government militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-
government militia is to the state and human security. More specifically, that semi-official 
pro-government militias carry less risk to the state and human security than informal pro-
government militias. Considering the aspect of human security, the results from the two 
case studies support the initial hypothesis. While it was previously assessed that the two 
case studies resulted in negative impacts on human security, the manner in which the 
threats towards the population manifested in each case study support that a semi-official 
militia is less likely to negatively impact human security. Specifically, the ALP had the 
most negative impacts on human security when individual members or units did not follow 
procedures that the government had established to guide their behavior. When ALP 
individuals and units followed government guidelines more closely, they had a more 
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benign impact on human security. Conversely, the Janjaweed, an informal militia often 
used tactics that greatly decreased human security, and the GoS often implicitly supported 
the Janjaweed’s harmful actions. Therefore, while both had negative impacts on human 
security, it appears that in the two cases evaluated, the inherent deniability associated with 
being an informal militia increased the negative impact.    
Determining, how the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government 
militia influence state security is more difficult. In the two cases examined, the results of a 
state operating in conjunction with pro-government militias were indeterminate. 
Consequently, there is not enough evidence in these two case studies to accurately identify 
a causal relationship or trend.  
e. How do the connections between pro-government militias and the 
general civilian population influence state security and human security? 
The initial hypothesized relationship about the connections between the populace 
and the militias held that pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local 
area are less dangerous to both state and human security than those that do not recruit from 
the local area. The ALP case study supported this argument; however, there was not enough 
reported evidence to support the argument in the case of the Janjaweed. In the case of the 
ALP, the ALP had the greatest reported positive impact on regime and human security 
when they operated in close accordance to the ALP’s guidelines of staying within their 
assigned locality. Correspondingly, there are many cases where ALP units negatively 
impacted regime and human security due to deviation from the ALP’s locality guidelines. 
Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on state 
and human security depends upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia 
within their own locality, supporting the above hypothesis.  
f. How do preexisting group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, 
religious, or resources-based conflict influence the impact of pro-
government militias on state and human security?  
This thesis initially argued that employing a pro-government militia in an area with 
preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-
based conflict likely leads to a high probability of negative impacts on state and human 
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security, and both cases supported the argument presented in the literature. Specifically, in 
the case of the ALP, the ALP is assessed to be more prone to prey on the local population 
when the local dynamics, such ethnic and political rivalries, don’t support the presence of 
a local militia. Similarly, in many cases, the negative impacts of the Janjaweed were greatly 
intensified by the region’s preexisting negative group dynamics, because the Janjaweed 
utilized the authority provided from the government to target previous competitors, 
sometimes beyond the intentions of the GoS. Overall, both cases clearly demonstrated that 
employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, 
such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict leads to a high probability 
of a negative impacts on state and human security.  
2. Limits of the Analysis and Future Research 
The analysis above was limited by many factors. First, due to time constraints, only 
two cases were selected for comparison in this thesis limiting the strength of the analysis. 
Second, the two cases selected were heavily engaged in significant counterinsurgencies 
during the main years researched for this thesis, likely increasing levels of violence. And 
finally, this thesis focused mainly on reviewing primary and secondary sources of 
information on each case study; however, in person interviews with members of both sides 
of the conflict would greatly strengthen the analysis. Therefore, to continue the research, 
further studies should be conducted on pro-government militias that are operating outside 
of current counterinsurgencies, and future research should focus on increasing the amount 
of primary source collection; specifically, on the topic of pro-government militia 
employment and efficacy.  
B. OVERALL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Throughout the world, governments interact with armed groups and militias 
intending to increase their security and position through unofficial means, and since 1982, 
the prevalence of pro-government militias throughout the world is increasing.235 
Correspondingly, it is important for both academia and the international community to 
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understand some of the possible and likely impacts of their employment. By examining the 
implementation, usage, and past and current results of the ALP in Afghanistan and the 
Janjaweed in Sudan, this thesis identifies two major implications of pro-government militia 
use. First, that the use of pro-government militias can provide limited increases in security 
to the principal who employed them, and second, that we should expect to see an inverse 
relationship between pro-government militia employment and human security.  
States can provide limited improvements to their security and stability through pro-
government militias, yet as demonstrated in the two cases compared, there are significant 
negative impacts when states delegate security to militias. In both Afghanistan and Sudan, 
the ALP and Janjaweed served as a force multiplier when they operated in accordance to 
their particular mandates, and in some instances provided an increase to state security and 
stability.  However, in both cases analyzed, elements of the pro-government militias 
deviated from their original objectives, with negative consequences. Because these were 
unofficial forces, there was little the governments could do to reign in the excesses – 
manifesting the principal agent problem that characterizes these relationship, for example, 
the ALP operating outside of their local assigned area, and the Janjaweed engaging targets 
beyond the control of GoS.236 Ultimately, in these situations, the impact of utilizing pro-
government militias often results in negative security repercussions to the state.  
Consequently, in future cases where either a state or foreign principle employ pro-
government militias, the international community should identify where militias are 
operating outside of their intended roles and monitor for security and stability decreases. 
In the two cases studied, it was overwhelmingly apparent that the presence of pro-
government militias greatly decreases human security. While there was limited reporting 
indicating that the ALP increased security in some sectors,237 the overwhelming majority 
of information collected on these two cases portrayed a situation that emphasized the 
negative impacts on human security by the ALP and Janjaweed. Specifically, the greatest 
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deteriorations in human security occurred in locations where ethnic, economic, or religious 
conflicts predated the employment of the pro-government militia by the state. Furthermore, 
the two cases examined demonstrated that informal pro-government militias are likely 
more predatory on the civilian population than semi-official militias. For example, the 
majority of reporting for this thesis emphasized that the GoS implicitly supported the 
Janjaweed’s actions against the local population; conversely, the majority of reported 
incidents against the human population by the ALP were conducted in situations where 
individuals operated outside of their authorities, formal or implied. Consequently, in future 
cases where either a state or foreign principal employ pro-government militias, the 
international community should expect a decrease in human security; furthermore, the 
international community should be especially wary of situations in which states employ 
pro-government militias informally or in areas of preexisting tensions.  
Pro-government militias will continue to play an important role in the domestic 
affairs of many countries for many years to come, and further studies will be required to 
adequately understand their current and future impact. This thesis intended to answers 
some of the outstanding questions on the topic; however, many impacts are still unknown. 
Overall, the implications of this thesis detailed some of the major relationships and impacts 
of pro-government militias on state and human security. Nevertheless, this thesis is only 
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